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1. The G20 was formed in
1999 in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis of
1997-98. Its members are
Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, the
European Union, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Until
November 2008, G20
meetings were held at the
level of finance ministers
and central bank governors,
not heads of state and/or
government.
2. Author’s conversation
with a senior European
economic policymaker, April
2014.
INTRODUCTION
The key phase of empowerment of the Group of
Twenty (G20) in the area of financial regulation
started with the group’s mid-November 2008 Wash-
ington summit1, which was novel in terms of format,
focus and ambition. First, financial regulatory dis-
cussions, which had until then been mainly the pre-
serve of the United States, Europe, and Japan (plus
Australia and Canada) were taken up by a grouping
in which emerging market economies represented
half of the members. Second, financial regulation
was pushed to the forefront of the global economic
cooperation agenda at the level of political princi-
pals, which had until then been mainly focused on
trade and macroeconomic policy. Third, the G20
committed to seek an unprecedented level of
cross-border consistency in their efforts on finan-
cial reform, a policy area that previously was seen
as belonging predominantly to the national level of
responsibility.
The G20 financial reform agenda has since gone
through a cycle of hype, disappointment and cyn-
icism. At the time of the first three summit meet-
ings (Washington in November 2008, London in
April 2009 and Pittsburgh in September 2009),
some leaders, including France’s Nicolas Sarkozy
and the United Kingdom’s Gordon Brown, devel-
oped a rhetoric that suggested a supranational
decision-making role for the G20, as opposed to a
coordinating role for decisions made by individual
jurisdictions. The London summit declaration sup-
ported this rhetoric by including phrases such as
“a global crisis requires a global solution” and
“prosperity is indivisible”. However, as the sense
of globally-shared and immediate danger that pre-
vailed in 2008-09 later dissipated, scepticism
took hold. Recent G20 meetings have been
described as “High-Church liturgy of a religion in
which nobody believes any longer”2.
Half a decade after the initiation of this reform
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effort, this Policy Contribution takes stock of the
G20’s financial reform achievements and chal-
lenges. Inevitably, the picture is mixed. First, and
in spite of the occasionally inspiring rhetoric of
individual leaders, there has been no overarching
coherence in the G20 reform agenda, which
resulted from multiple compromises between the
group’s members. Nor has there been much unity
of purpose or action in its implementation, which
even after five years remains a work in progress.
Second, there is no cross-cutting analytical con-
sensus on the causes and drivers of the financial
crisis of 2007-08, let alone on the appropriate
policy response. Thus, initiatives that will be
labelled policy achievements by some informed
observers might be deemed policy mistakes by
other equally informed observers. The assess-
ments provided in this paper are the author’s own.
The G20 delivered on many of its individual com-
mitments. While some of the group’s declarations,
such as a repeated pledge about convergence of
global accounting standards, have yielded no tan-
gible result, most have led to at least some policy
action that may be viewed as sufficient for the G20
to declare victory. Some of these actions, such as
the capital and leverage provisions of the Basel III
accord, represent substantial improvements com-
pared to what existed before.
At a broader level, however, the global financial
reform effort of the past five years cannot be con-
sidered an unambiguous success. In spite of
some meaningful advances, it has established
neither an adequate institutional infrastructure
nor a consistent policy vision for the global finan-
cial system, raising doubts both about future
financial stability and about the sustainability of
current levels of cross-border financial integration.
Even the more modest but crucial aim of building
effective global tools to observe the global finan-
cial system and monitor risk remains more of a
promise than a reality. 
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The 2007-08 financial crisis was, to a great extent,
the result of a failure of public authorities in the
United States and Europe to adequately monitor
and address systemic risk. By comparison, Asia
and other parts of the world where memories of
systemic financial crises were still fresh, had
adopted more prudent policies and practices, and
were less impacted by the subprime-triggered
financial shockwaves. In such a context, initial US
and European policy responses involved a signif-
icant degree of improvisation and learning by
doing. The G20 financial reform agenda mirrors
this reality. It is spelled out as a collection of indi-
vidual policy initiatives motivated by the obser-
vation of specific cases of financial system
dysfunction in 2007-08, rather than being based
on a joined-up analytical framework about the
underlying drivers of the crisis. There was no
global consensus on the latter in 2008-09 when
the G20 agenda was first articulated, and there is
arguably still none today.
In terms of process, the first G20 summit in Wash-
ington was an immediate sequel to the dramatic
developments of September and October 2008,
including the nationalisation of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the
public rescue of AIG in the United States and of a
number of prominent banks in Europe, the vote by
Congress to approve the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) and subsequent forced public recap-
italisations of 25 large US banks, and the
European agreement of 12-15 October 2008 on a
joint approach to address the crisis. While the
definitive history of these  events remains to be
written, it appears that, in October 2008, European
leaders insisted on an international meeting at the
level of heads of state and government, and the
US president insisted on the G20 format as a
straightforward way to bring large emerging
economies, especially China, into the discussion.
It rapidly became evident that the G20 needed to
rely on permanent institutional infrastructure to
3. As of 2008, the Financial
Stability Forum’s member-
ship included Australia,
Canada, France, Germany,
Hong Kong SAR, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands,
Singapore, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the
United States, as well as the
European Central Bank and
a number of global institu-
tions and bodies. The
expansion in 2009 added
Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Spain and Turkey, as well as
the European Commission.
Each jurisdiction is repre-
sented by between one and
three individuals, bringing
the total to 70 individual
members of the FSB. The
FSB also created a Steering
Committee, which as of Jan-
uary 2014 included 41 of
its members.
4. The FSB membership
includes ten institutions
and bodies with a global
remit: the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS),
the Committee on the
Global Financial System
(CGFS), the Committee on
Payments and Settlement
Systems (CPSS), the Inter-
national Association of
Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS), the International
Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Organisa-
tion of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO), the
Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the World
Bank.
‘The 2007-08 financial crisis was, to a great extent, the result of a failure of public authorities in
the US and Europe to adequately monitor and address systemic risk. Initial US and European
policy responses involved a significant degree of improvisation and learning by doing.’
ensure follow-up and delivery of the leaders’
numerous commitments. Inevitably, this triggered
some competition for turf among existing institu-
tions. The successive G20 declarations illustrate
the gradual emergence of a consensus on giving a
central role to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
which was renamed the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) at the London summit. Like the G20, the FSF
had been initially established in 1999 in the wake
of the Asian financial crisis, but its membership
had initially been limited to advanced economies
and was expanded to large emerging economies
only at the time of its rebranding into FSB in 20093.
The Washington summit declaration repeatedly
refers to “the IMF, expanded FSF, and other regu-
lators and bodies” for the coordination and moni-
toring of implementation of the decisions made at
the summit. In a similar context, the London
summit declaration refers to “the FSB and the
IMF”, and the Pittsburgh summit declaration to the
FSB alone. Subsequently, the FSB has effectively
acted as a secretariat for the G20 as regards its
financial reform agenda, and as a coordinator of
the G20-related policy development processes of
other global financial bodies4.
In terms of content and as previously mentioned,
the G20 agenda is best described as a fairly long
list of separate initiatives, which do not unequivo-
cally refer to a single overarching policy narrative.
Most of the individual action items fall into three
broad categories: regulation, coordination and
observation.
The items on regulation can themselves be
divided into two subgroups. On the one hand, the
G20 decided to tighten or strengthen the regula-
tory framework applying to entities or activities
that had already been regulated before the crisis.
Examples include: a more demanding framework
for the capital, leverage, and liquidity of banks,
prepared by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) and known as the Basel III
accord since its initial exposition in 2010; special
regulatory treatment of systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs), such as additional
Unsurprisingly, the G20 agenda has evolved over
time and successive summits. Some items have
lost prominence, either because most of the
desired work was considered achieved (eg capi-
tal standards with the finalisation of Basel III), or,
on the contrary, because the initial ambition has
proven difficult or impossible to fulfil (eg global
accounting harmonisation). Other items have
gained prominence over time, some of them fol-
lowing changing political circumstances in influ-
ential jurisdictions, or the realisation of possible
unintended consequences of earlier initiatives.
Specifically, since 2012 the FSB has explicitly
referred to “ending too-big-to-fail (TBTF)” as one of
its main objectives, an ambition that was not for-
mulated in such explicit and ambitious terms in
prior documents. The issue of how the financial
system may foster long-term investment has also
moved up the G20 agenda in recent years.
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
The scattered nature and complexity of the G20
financial reform agenda make it difficult to sum-
marise its execution. The following non-exhaus-
tive list focuses on the items deemed by the
author as most significant.
• Bank capital and leverage: Basel III unques-
tionably marks an improvement over its prede-
cessor, the Basel II capital accord of 2004,
which is now widely seen as inadequate and a
contributor to the crisis in Europe. The defini-
tion of capital, or characterisation of instru-
ments that are sufficiently loss-absorbing to be
treated as equity for regulatory purposes, has
been considerably tightened; minimum ratios
have been increased; some risks and assets
that could have been placed off-balance sheet
under previous conventions can no longer be;
and the introduction of a leverage ratio, which
existed before the crisis in the United States
but not in other jurisdictions, creates a check
against the possibility of risk-weighting calcu-
lations being gamed by banks. Additional, so-
called ‘macroprudential’ capital requirements
may also be placed either on the most sys-
temically important banks (assessed at the
global, regional, or national level), or on all
banks at high points of observed financial
cycles (‘counter-cyclical buffers’). Some
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capital (or in the Basel jargon, ‘loss absorbency’)
requirements; and additional disclosure obliga-
tions for banks. On the other hand, entities or activ-
ities that until 2008 were mostly outside of the
scope of regulators were made subject to a com-
prehensive regulatory framework, eg over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, executive
compensation, credit rating agencies, hedge
funds, ‘shadow banking’ (ie entities and activities
that are not regulated as banks but present bank-
like systemic risk profiles) and, more recently,
financial benchmarks (following the uncovering of
fraud in the setting of LIBOR, the London Interbank
Offered Rate, and other similar reference rates).
Among the coordination items, two stand out. First,
the G20 attempted to force global accounting har-
monisation, by calling repeatedly for “interna-
tional accounting bodies” (widely understood to
refer primarily to the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and to the US Financial
Accounting Standards Board, or FASB) to “achieve
a single set of high-quality, global accounting
standards”. Second, the G20 started an ambitious
effort, which is still ongoing, to address the coor-
dination issues that might arise in the resolution
of complex financial institutions, including banks,
whose activities are scattered across several juris-
dictions. Also in this category, the G20 has paid
special attention to the question of whether the
special features of emerging markets and devel-
oping economies were adequately addressed in
the global financial regulatory agenda.
Finally, the items on observing the financial
system are generally referred to under the
umbrella label of ‘data gaps’ in the G20 and FSB
jargon. While this expression suggests an aim lim-
ited to plugging holes in the existing statistical and
financial surveillance apparatus, it actually also
covers an ambitious and unprecedented effort to
build global sets of data, the interrogation of which
might be relevant for the assessment of systemic
risk. This is specifically attempted in two key
areas: large banks, with the creation of an ‘inter-
national data hub’ of non-public bank-level infor-
mation within the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS); and derivatives markets, with
the requirement to report all OTC derivatives trans-
actions to ‘trade repositories’ and the aim to aggre-
gate the corresponding data at the global level.
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5. Note: the author is an
independent director of the
global trade repository arm
of DTCC, a financial
infrastructure firm that is
run on a non-profit basis.
covered by what is known as ‘pillar 3’ of the
Basel supervisory framework. In this area, the
FSB has identified best practices but has until
now remained somewhat reluctant to stan-
dardise disclosure requirements for financial
stability purposes, which supervisors have
tended to delegate to accounting standard set-
ters. The latter habit is questionable, given that
financial accounting is primarily about serving
the information needs of investors, and the
mandate and objectives of accounting stan-
dard setters are therefore structurally distinct
from those of prudential authorities.
• OTC derivatives: The G20 Pittsburgh summit set
an end-2012 deadline for the introduction of
major derivatives markets reforms, but the
implementation has proven more difficult and
protracted than initially envisaged – not least
in the EU, the largest single jurisdiction in terms
of derivatives trading volumes, where some of
the requirements are not yet fully implemented
(central clearing) or have started being imple-
mented only recently (mandatory trade report-
ing since 12 February 2014). The aim of
identifying shifts and concentrations of risk
through systematic reporting of derivatives
transactions to trade repositories appears
appropriate. However the choices made for its
implementation might result in the relevant
information remaining fragmented across mul-
tiple repositories and jurisdictions in a way that
does not allow for global aggregation, and might
limit the ability of regulators to see the full pic-
ture5. Separately, the requirement that all OTC
derivatives be cleared in central counterparties
(CCPs) might bring more transparency, but also
implies a concentration of risk in CCPs, with no
certainty yet that this risk will be adequately
managed. Many of the derivatives market
reforms involve significant costs, both in terms
of transition and steady state, and it is not yet
clear to what extent such costs will be offset by
gains in financial stability.
• Resolution of systemically important banks:
The FSB has accomplished significant work on
how to structure contracts between legal enti-
ties in different countries within international
banking groups, and minimum requirements of
debt on which losses may be imposed on cred-
observers, mostly in the banking community,
consider Basel III too strict, and argue its adop-
tion has contributed to a scarcity of credit, par-
ticularly in Europe, and to a migration of risk
outside of the regulated banking sector. Others,
particularly in academia, see it as too lax, with
too-low minimum ratios and too many oppor-
tunities for regulatory arbitrage and gaming of
the rules. To this author, the capital and lever-
age provisions of Basel III represent a broadly
balanced, ambitious yet practical step towards
a better capitalised banking system, and can
thus be counted as a policy success.
• Bank liquidity: In comparison to the provisions
on capital and leverage, Basel III’s requirements
on bank liquidity represented a more experi-
mental and unprecedented effort, with a
greater potential for unintended economic con-
sequences. With this in mind, the BCBS has set
a long testing and transition period for the intro-
duction of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR),
which aims at preventing short-term liquidity
shortages in periods of financial stress, and an
even longer one for the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR), which has a broader aim of balancing
the liquidity profiles of banks’ assets and lia-
bilities. The liquidity problems encountered by
US and European banks in 2007-08 make it
appropriate that the BCBS should introduce liq-
uidity standards. However it remains to be seen
whether the specific solutions it has outlined
will prove adequate.
• Data gaps: A number of improvements have
been jointly agreed in various forums, includ-
ing the BIS and International Monetary Fund, to
improve the delivery and cross-border consis-
tency of statistical data and thus enable an
improved understanding of financial systems
and better comparisons across jurisdictions.
The international data hub at the BIS has the
potential to allow policymakers to form a
refined picture of risk exposures and concen-
trations among banks, even though it remains
too early to judge the actual delivery – not least
because access to the relevant information is
to be strictly controlled, and mostly reserved to
banking supervisors. A separate but related
area is that of public disclosures on risk by indi-
vidual financial institutions, part of which are
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itors in the event of resolution (dubbed ‘gone-
concern loss absorbing capital’, or GLAC). How-
ever it remains to be seen how these
theoretically compelling arrangements will
work in practice, particularly as most jurisdic-
tions outside the United States have limited
concrete experience of resolution processes,
and many had not even introduced a special
resolution regime for banks into their domestic
legislation until recently. The FSB’s current
description of its objective as “ending TBTF”
may be setting the bar too high. From this per-
spective the spelling out by the FSB in 2011 of
“key attributes for effective resolution regimes”
was a constructive contribution to a general
shift toward such regimes, but it might be a long
time before their effectiveness can be actually
assessed, depending on the occurrence of
future crises.
• Nonbank SIFIs and shadow banking: In line with
the pledge made by the G20 at the London
summit “to extend regulation and oversight to
all systemically important financial institu-
tions, instruments and markets”, the FSB has
endeavoured to produce specific regulatory
frameworks for systemically important insur-
ers, asset managers, financial infrastructures
and for a handful of market segments bundled
under the imprecise label of ‘shadow banking’.
While certain market segments such as con-
stant-net-asset-value money-market mutual
funds clearly require tighter regulation or per-
haps even a ban, there is a distinct risk that the
FSB approach in this area would insufficiently
take into account the diversity of the financial
system and the specific risk profiles of various
forms of nonbank financial intermediation. Iron-
ically, a misguided regulatory framework
applied to insurers and certain categories of
funds might end up defeating the initiative’s
purpose by making their behaviour more pro-
cyclical, and impairing their ability to smooth
financial cycles given the long maturity of their
liabilities.
• Accounting convergence: On this, the G20
agenda has unambiguously failed. Successive
deadlines set by the G20 for the completion of
IASB and FASB convergence projects have been
conspicuously ignored by the independent
accounting standard setters. This does not nec-
essarily imply that no further progress will ever
be made toward global accounting harmonisa-
tion, including in the United States, even
though many observers have grown increas-
ingly sceptical on this count over the last five
years. If any such progress is made, however, it
is likely to be difficult to attribute it even par-
tially to any momentum created by the G20.
• Institutional developments: While the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s led to the cre-
ation of new institutions or groupings, includ-
ing the G20 and the FSF, no major new global
institutions have been created in the wake of
the crisis of 2007-08. The exceptions are lim-
ited in purpose, such as the OTC Derivatives
Regulators Group (ODRG), at this stage a spe-
cialised working party of 11 regulatory agen-
cies in eight jurisdictions rather than a
permanent institution, and the Global Legal
Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), a new legal
entity set up to coordinate the allocation of
unique coded labels to all legal entities that
enter into certain types of financial transac-
tions, particularly for derivatives trade report-
ing. However there have been notable
institutional developments. In particular, the
membership of most global financial authori-
ties and bodies, including the IMF and FSF/FSB,
was expanded or rebalanced to better repre-
sent large emerging economies, mirroring the
shift from G7/G8 to G20 as “the premier forum
for (...) international economic cooperation” in
the words of the Pittsburgh summit declaration.
In contrast to previous attitudes, all major
economies, including the United States and
China, have agreed to submit themselves reg-
ularly to the discipline of a financial stability
assessment programme (FSAP) of the IMF and
the World Bank (the latter only for emerging
market economies). The Basel Committee has
pioneered an effort to monitor the adoption of
its accords across jurisdictions, including in
terms of the completeness of compliance and
consistency of implementation. Even in the
absence of any enforcement authority, this
unprecedented effort appears likely to foster
more consistent implementation through peer
pressure and public identification of noncom-
pliant jurisdictions.
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Beyond these specific points, two broader and
interrelated concerns are likely to gain increasing
attention as the consequences of the G20 finan-
cial reform agenda gradually unfold.
First those global institutions that exist lack broad-
based acceptance, a weakness that can easily
translate into a deficit of authority. Most are set up
as voluntary groupings rather than treaty-based
institutions, and even those that do have a treaty
basis (the BIS, the IMF, the OECD and the World
Bank) have no enforceable financial regulatory
mandate. The willingness of individual jurisdic-
tions to respect the choices made by these global
bodies is therefore essential. However even after
the above-mentioned expansion or modification
of the membership of several of these organisa-
tions, there are still major imbalances in the way
different parts of the world are represented, as
shown by table 1.
Table 1 suggests a structural over-representation
of Europe in the functioning of the institutional
system, and a corresponding under-representa-
tion of other parts of the world, in particular China.
While there may be multiple reasons, not all of
them to be blamed on Europe, it creates a risk of
widely different levels of commitment to the
global reform agenda across different jurisdic-
tions—even though correcting these institutional
imbalances might also lead to forms of disen-
gagement by some stakeholders6. An area of par-
ticular importance is the governance
arrangements applying to the FSB, given that
body’s pivotal role in driving the G20 financial
reform agenda. The FSB has initiated a review of
the structure of its representation, which is
expected to lead to proposals to the G20 later in
2014.
Second, in the absence of strong global financial
regulatory institutions, the combination of an
ambitious regulatory agenda with the fragmenta-
tion of regulatory and supervisory authorities
across individual jurisdictions is bound to result
in limitations of cross-border financial integration
– in spite of the G20’s repeated commitment to
support “an open world economy based on
market principles”, as the London summit decla-
ration put it. Even if there is no specific intent to
erect barriers, the sheer number of independent
centres of decision-making makes it difficult for
regulated market participants to maintain a glob-
ally integrated approach. For example, the G20
has encouraged individual jurisdictions to create
regulatory and supervisory frameworks for credit
rating agencies, which until 2008 were unregu-
lated in most countries. As a consequence, there
is a tangible risk that over time, divergent regula-
tory and supervisory approaches could make it
increasingly difficult for rating agencies to main-
tain the global consistency of rating methodolo-
gies that has been until now a key feature of their
contribution to the functioning of capital markets.
Such concerns are aggravated by the behavioural
and cognitive bias of national supervisory author-
ities, which generally perceive more scope for
supervisory failure in third countries than within
their own geographical remit. As a consequence,
they tend to give more weight to the risk of cross-
border financial integration creating channels of
financial contagion that would contribute to
6. In the context of negotia-
tions over the proposed
Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, US
Trade Representative
Michael Froman was
reported as observing that
the “EU often only recog-
nises international stan-
dard-setting bodies where
EU members cast the bulk
of the votes”; Patrick Henry,
‘Regulation Biggest Barrier
to Integrated U.S.–EU Trade:
Froman’, Bloomberg News,
30 September 2013.
Table 1 Distribution of selected indicators between regions
Europe
United
States
China*
Rest of Asia-
Pacific
Rest of world
GDP 24% 22% 12% 20% 22%
Banking assets 43% 12% 15% 20% 10%
Financial assets 29% 34% 10% 17% 10%
FSB members 40% 7% 6% 24% 23%
FSB Steering Committee members 46% 10% 2% 22% 20%
Leadership positions in global bodies 60% 7% 0% 20% 13%
Headquarters of global bodies 82% 18% 0% 0% 0%
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database,  April 2014,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx; author’s calculations based on The Banker database,
2012, http://www.thebankerdatabase.com/; author’s calculations based on McKinsey Global Institute, Financial Globalization:
Retreat or Reset? March 2013, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/global_capital_markets/financial_globalization; Financial Stabil-
ity Board, 2014, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/. Note: * China includes Hong Kong SAR and Macau SAR in this calculation.
FSB = Financial Stability Board.
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‘importing instability’ than to the possibility of it
acting as a dampener on instability generated at
home – even though there have also been numer-
ous observed instances of ‘importing stability’. For
example, in the Baltic states, the fact that most
local banks were owned by Scandinavian groups
had a stabilising effect in 2008-10 in the face of
severe domestic economic and property-price
downturns. Because of this cognitive bias, super-
visory authorities may choose to ‘ringfence’ finan-
cial firms and activities along national borders,
more than would be justified by a rigorous eco-
nomic cost-benefit consideration.
PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS
The weakness of international financial regulatory
institutional arrangements highlighted in the pre-
vious section can be expected to result in an
increased scope for inconsistencies, contradic-
tions and conflicts between jurisdictions as the
G20 financial reform agenda keeps moving toward
implementation on the ground. A template for
such conflicts can be found in the recent tug-of-
war between the United States and China about
auditor supervision. In the wake of accounting
scandals in the early 2000s, such as at Enron and
WorldCom, audit firms became publicly regulated,
first in the United States and then in most other
G20 jurisdictions. But this new regulatory frame-
work failed to take into account the unique degree
of cross-border integration of audit activities, a key
reason why almost all audits of large companies
are entrusted to only four powerful global net-
works. As a result, audit firms are subjected to
mutually incompatible requirements from public
authorities in the United States and China, with no
global structure to mediate or resolve disputes.
Similarly, differences in regulatory approaches
may prevent fulfilment of the aim of aggregating
derivative trade data at the global level, even as
transactions are now reported to trade reposito-
ries in all major jurisdictions where derivative trad-
ing takes place.
Without an evidently undesirable new episode of
global financial instability, there is no clear
prospect for renewed reform momentum coming
from the G20. Among other factors, geopolitical
instability in eastern Europe could impair the col-
lective authority of the G20 by making it more dif-
ficult to display unity of purpose. Moreover, the
public uncovering in 2013 of widespread covert
international data-gathering activity by US intelli-
gence agencies may have a durable negative
impact on the ability of G20 jurisdictions to
exchange financial data, a key condition for effec-
tive global financial regulatory cooperation.
It would be excessive, however, to conclude that
the G20 financial reform agenda is condemned to
irrelevance or paralysis. Significant progress
remains realistically possible on several fronts. To
name only a few: the BCBS effort to monitor the
adoption and implementation of Basel III could
lead the EU to amend its existing legislation
(known as the Capital Requirements Regulation)
to make it fully compliant with the global accord,
and could separately nudge banks into adopting
more realistic and consistent risk-weighting prac-
tices. Significantly better and more informative
public statistical data about financial systems and
activities might be produced in coordination by
the BIS and IMF, and might lead to analytical
breakthroughs in understanding how the global
financial system actually functions and its impact
on the global economy. The US authorities might
allow domestic-listed companies to shift to inter-
national financial reporting standards (IFRS) on a
voluntary basis, as is now the case in Japan, thus
paving the way for a gradual generalisation of the
use of IFRS, at least among larger companies.
Better arrangements might be found to assign
unique identifiers to individual derivatives trans-
actions and to phase out existing divergences
between regulatory frameworks on OTC deriva-
tives in major jurisdictions. To be sure, each of
these steps would encounter significant political
obstacles, but none of them currently appears
entirely beyond the scope of possibility.
Nevertheless, even such significant advances
‘The continued weakness of international financial regulatory institutional arrangements can be
expected to result in an increased scope for inconsistencies, contradictions and conflicts
between jurisdictions as the G20 financial reform agenda keeps moving toward implementation.’
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7. From this standpoint, the
recent establishment of the
Global Legal. Entity
Identifier Foundation
(GLEIF) as a Swiss
foundation with a seat in
Basel may be viewed as a
missed opportunity. 
might prove insufficient to counter the risk of frag-
mentation of the global financial space highlighted
in the previous section. While no analytical con-
sensus exists among economists about the ben-
efits of global financial integration, its reversal
could prove severely damaging for global eco-
nomic integration and growth. To avoid such a
development, still more ambitious endeavours
might need to be considered in the future.
To foster global buy-in, more policymakers from
emerging-market economies should accede to
leadership positions in global financial regulatory
bodies. Existing or newly formed bodies should be
located in Asia, and not exclusively in Europe or
the United States as is currently the case7. For
example, the permanent secretariat of the FSB,
which is very limited in size, could be relocated
from Basel to Hong Kong, where the BIS already
has a representative office for which it has
negotiated extensive privileges and immunities
for its international staff, or to Singapore. Similarly,
the International Forum of Independent Audit
Regulators is considering the establishment of a
permanent secretariat to support its expanding
activities, and might choose to locate it in a major
Asian financial centre that could offer sufficient
privileges and immunities as well as political
stability.
To support global financial integration, an ambi-
tious but circumscribed objective would be to
ensure a consistent basis of financial information.
Regulated information intermediaries such as
credit rating agencies, audit firms and trade repos-
itories play a crucial role, and their supervision at
the international level by supranational supervi-
sory authorities might need to be envisaged to
deliver this aim. If this sounds utopian, one may
recall that similar scepticism greeted the vision of
EU-level supervision of individual financial firms
before the crisis—but now the European Securi-
ties and Markets Authority (ESMA) directly super-
vises credit rating agencies throughout the EU,
and the European Central Bank is expected to
supervise most of the euro area’s banking system
starting in November 2014. Moreover, unlike
banks or CCPs, these information intermediaries
do not carry significant financial risk, with the con-
sequence that their supervision at the suprana-
tional level would not need to involve any
meaningful financial risk sharing among the
world’s governments, beyond the limited cost of
operating the supranational authority. It would
nevertheless require a treaty, and international
legal and judiciary infrastructure, which do not cur-
rently exist, at least in the financial area. Innova-
tive hybrid public-private governance
arrangements could also be considered, building
on a number of precedents of remarkable public
policy achievements by non-profit global bodies
with a public-interest identity, such as the IASB. 
CONCLUSION
The definition and implementation of the G20
financial reform agenda has seen a number of
successes. But the global institutional infrastruc-
ture on which it is currently predicated is not suf-
ficient to support the vision of a financial system
that would be both globally integrated, and ade-
quately regulated over the medium-to-long term.
To address this challenge, further institutional
change, experimentation and innovation should
be considered by G20 policymakers. They should
not be afraid of trial and error. If, conversely, they
choose to rely exclusively on established institu-
tional and procedural patterns, the risk is that they
will eventually reach a point at which they would
have to durably renounce the economic and other
benefits of an open financial world. The global
experiment that started with the Washington,
London and Pittsburgh summits still has a long
way to go.
